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I. INTRODUCTION
Is there any moral justification for the way American law singles out
religion for special protection?  What is the appropriate moral attitude to
take toward religion? 
In two recent papers, Brian Leiter argues that there is no good reason 
for law to single out religion for special treatment and religion is not
an apt candidate for respect in the “thick” sense of being an object of
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favorable appraisal.1  Special treatment would be appropriate only if
there were some “moral reason why states should carve out special 
protections that encourage individuals to structure their lives around 
categorical demands that are insulated from the standards of evidence
and reasoning we everywhere else expect to constitute constraints on
judgment and action.”2  Favorable appraisal would be called for “[o]nly if
there were a positive correlation between beliefs that were culpably
without epistemic warrant and valuable outcomes.”3 
Both arguments depend on a radically impoverished conception of
what religion is and what it does. 
In this paper, I will explain what Leiter leaves out and offer a
hypothesis about why.  I will also engage with some related reflections
by Simon Blackburn and Timothy Macklem, both of whom influence, 
in different ways, Leiter’s analysis. 
II. TOLERATION AND CONSCIENCE
In his earlier article, Leiter frames the problem as whether religion 
should be singled out for “special consideration as opposed to other 
important matters of conscience.”4  The moral basis for religious
toleration, he claims, must be “that religious beliefs are often matters 
of conscience, and thus would fall within the scope of any argument,
like the Rawlsian one, for protecting liberty of conscience.”5  Religion 
is of moral interest only because and insofar as it is a species of
conscience.6 The puzzle, then, is why “[f]eatures that all and only
 1. Brian Leiter, Foundations of Religious Liberty: Toleration or Respect?, 47
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 935, 951–57 (2010) [hereinafter Leiter, Foundations]; Brian Leiter, 
Why Tolerate Religion?, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 2, 24–27 (2008) [hereinafter Leiter, 
Why Tolerate Religion?]. 
 2. Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, supra note 1, at 25.
 3. Leiter, Foundations, supra note 1, at 957. 
 4. Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, supra note 1, at 7.
5. Id. at 12.  For other formulations that emphasize conscience, see also id. at
20, 24 n.58, 25, 26. 
6. There are two passages in Why Tolerate Religion? in which Leiter indicates
that he has a different set of concerns.  Leiter states that he will confine his “attention to 
the principled reasons why the state should refrain from a distribution of benefits and 
burdens that has as its intended consequence the disfavoring of religion or of particular
religions.”  Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, supra note 1, at 5.  This has nothing to do
with conscience.  The state can burden conscience without intending to do so. That is the
issue in the religious accommodation cases.  If your central concern is burdens on 
conscience, why should it matter what the state intends?  There are also many ways of
distributing burdens that disfavor some religions without encumbering anyone’s
conscience, such as religious displays or the official endorsement of religious propositions.
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religious beliefs have” should provide reasons for singling them out for 
special protection.7 
This way of setting up the problem generates his working definition of
religion:
 (1) Religious belief issues in categorical demands on action, that is, 
demands that must be satisfied, no matter what an individual’s antecedent
desires and no matter what incentives or disincentives the world offers up; 
and, 
(2) Religious beliefs do not answer ultimately (or at the limit) to evidence and 
reasons, as evidence and reasons are understood in other domains concerned 
with knowledge of the world.  Religious beliefs, in virtue of being based on
“faith,” are insulated from ordinary standards of evidence and rational
justification, the ones we employ in both common-sense and in science.8 
Part (1) of the definition isolates those aspects of religion that generate 
conscientious objections to laws.  Part (2) then tries to delimit the 
pertinent quality that makes a subset of the demands described in part
(1) religious. 
As a semantic matter, this is a curious definition of religion.  The 
emphasis on conscience focuses excessively on duty, which is only a 
See Andrew Koppelman, Religious Establishment and Autonomy, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 
291, 291 (2008). 
Leiter’s statement of his purpose is puzzling for other reasons: if his worry is 
unjustified singling out of religion for special favor, then he should be equally worried
about a distribution of benefits and burdens that has as its intended consequence the 
favoring of religion or of particular religions—the Supreme Court has gone back and 
forth about whether such singling out of religion is constitutionally required, but it has 
been steadfast in holding that it is permissible.
The second passage says that questions about legal accommodation will be addressed
in a later paper and notes with approval the idea, argued by Martha Nussbaum, “that ‘equal
respect’ considerations are likely to demand substantial religious accommodation,
given the ease with which ‘neutrality’ considerations will favor the de facto dominant 
religious culture.”  Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, supra note 1, at 27 n.60 (citing MARTHA 
C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (2008)).  Here the concern is majoritarian
bias; for example, in a society suspicious of recreational drugs but in which there is a
large Catholic population, drug use favored by the dominant religion, such as the 
consumption of wine, will not be criminalized, while minority drugs such as peyote 
are likely to be less well treated.  This argument, to work, needs further specification. 
The fact that you are on the losing side of a political debate does not state an equality
claim in any other context.  Why is losing a religiously inflected debate different, unless 
religion is something distinctively important? 
Because he never returns to these themes but instead focuses fairly consistently on
conscience, I will ignore these passages hereafter.
 7. Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, supra note 1, at 12.
8. Id. at 15 (footnote omitted). 
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small part of religious motivation.  Many and perhaps most people
engage in religious practice out of habit; adherence to custom; a need 
to cope with misfortune, injustice, temptation, and guilt; curiosity about
religious truth; a desire to feel connected to God; or happy religious
enthusiasm, rather than a sense of duty prescribed by sacred texts or 
fear of divine punishment.9  Any of these, or some combination of them, 
might be the basis for special consideration.  American law does not 
confine its focus on religion in the way that Leiter does. For example,
the most recent congressional pronouncement on religious liberty, the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, declares
that “[t]he term ‘religious exercise’ includes any exercise of religion, 
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”10 
But perhaps Leiter is uninterested in the semantic meaning.  He cites 
with approval Timothy Macklem’s objection to reliance on the semantic
meaning of religion as a moral category.11  Macklem observes that the
question of what religion conventionally means is a semantic one, but
the question of what beliefs are entitled to special treatment is a moral
one, and it requires a moral rather than a semantic answer.  So Leiter
may be untroubled by the oddness of his definition.12  The definition of
religion just discussed is meant to capture what is singled out for “the 
special treatment [religion] is accorded in, for example, American and 
Canadian constitutional law.”13 
9. See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 
1, 25–26; William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 321 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 
1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 26–27. 
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2006).  Some of the state statutes mandating
religious accommodation have similar language.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493
(2004); FLA. STAT. § 761.02 (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-401 (2006); 775 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/5 (West 2001); MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.302 (West Supp. 2010); 
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.001 (West 2005).  But see 71 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2403 (West Supp. 2009) (adopting a more restrictive definition of a substantial
burden).
 11. Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, supra note 1, at 13 n.30 (citing TIMOTHY 
MACKLEM, INDEPENDENCE OF MIND 120–26 (2006)). 
12. He does, however, work hard to show that his definition fits the semantic 
meaning, conceding that it would be problematic if it included Marxism or morality as such. 
 13. Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, supra note 1, at 2.  It is not clear how 
important the special treatment of religion in constitutional law is to his argument; in
the preceding sentence he refers to the problem as whether “we ought to accord special
legal and moral treatment to religious practices,” as if this were the same thing.  Id.  In
fact, American law does pervasively give special legal and moral treatment to religious 
practices, although much of this is not constitutionally compelled.  For example, federal 
law, with respect to federal statutes, and many state statutes require that burdens on 
religion be lifted unless they are the least restrictive means for achieving a compelling state 
interest.  For a survey, see Douglas Laycock, Comment, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge
964
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If Leiter is interested in American law, however, conscience is a 
misleading place to begin.14  Some special treatment of religion can easily 
fit under the rubric of conscience, some much less so.  It is most relevant 
if one is considering religious accommodation, such as the exemption
of Quakers from the military draft, and there is some evidence that this
is what Leiter has in mind.15  This was once constitutionally required. 
It is no longer, but religion still gets special protection not accorded 
to other beliefs, and the state is allowed to single out religion for
accommodation.16 
Even accommodation is not just about conscience, however.  Many 
religious claims that are uncontroversially weighty and that nearly
everyone would want to accommodate—which American law does
accommodate—are not conscientious.  A paradigm case for religious 
exemption, for most proponents of such exemptions, is the ritual use of
peyote by the Native American Church, which the Supreme Court
of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 155, 211–12 & nn.368–73 (2004). 
14. It is of greater interest to him in Why Tolerate Religion? than in Foundations.  In
the latter essay, he says that he is not specifically trying to account for existing American
law, though “legal doctrine is a relevant data point for the inquiry.”  Leiter, Foundations, 
supra note 1, at 936. 
15. The one specific example of special treatment of religion that he discusses in
the case is Sikhs who feel obligated to carry ceremonial knives, even in school.  Leiter,
Why Tolerate Religion?, supra note 1, at 11–12, 26 n.59.  The Canadian court that took
up this issue may have been too deferential to the Sikhs, but this is a distraction from the
issue that should really concern him: the fact that the Sikhs had a right to bring a claim to
court in the first place, a claim that would have been summarily dismissed had it been
nonreligious. 
16. The privileged status of religion is somewhat diminished after Employment
Division v. Smith, which held that there is no right to religious exemptions from laws 
of general applicability.  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by 
statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 
1488, as recognized in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546
U.S. 418 (2006).  Even after Smith, however, religions retain some special protection that
nonreligious beliefs do not share.  In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), the Court struck down four ordinances that a city had
enacted with the avowed purpose of preventing a Santeria church from practicing animal 
sacrifice. Id. at 547. The laws, the Court held, violated the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment because their object was the suppression of a religious practice. Id. at
542, 547. The result would have been different if the law had targeted a club that did
exactly what the Santeria did, not as part of a religious ritual, but because its members
thought that killing animals was fun. 
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declined to protect in Employment Division v. Smith17 but which 
received legislative accommodation shortly thereafter.18  Yet neither of
the claimants in Smith was motivated to use peyote by religious
conscience.  Al Smith was motivated primarily by interest in exploring 
his Native American racial identity, and Galen Black was merely
curious about the church.19 
Conscience is also underinclusive because it focuses on those cases 
in which the agents feel impelled by duties that they are capable of 
performing without depending on external contingencies.  Conscience 
is a poor characterization of the desire of a church to expand its 
building to be able to hold its growing congregation, as in City of 
Boerne v. Flores.20  Conscientious resistance to the law was not an 
option.  The reconstruction could not be done without the help of
architects and contractors, whom the city could prevent from doing the 
work merely by withholding the necessary permits.  The problem is 
even more pronounced in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass’n,21 a widely criticized decision in which Native Americans
objected to a proposed logging road that would pass through an ancient 
worship site sacred to their tribe.22  The logging road, the Court 
conceded, would “virtually destroy” the ability of the Native Americans 
“to practice their religion.”23  Nonetheless, the Court, evidently persuaded 
that exemptions had to be based on conscience, held that there was no 
constitutionally cognizable burden because the logging road had “no 
tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious
beliefs.”24  Once more, Congress quickly reversed this result.25 
17. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.  This result was superseded by federal statute, which
the Court has willingly followed.  See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 424. 
18. See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 243 (2007). 
19. See Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment 
Division v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 959–65, 978–85 (1998). 
20. 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997), superseded by statute, Protection of Religious
Exercise in Land Use and by Institutionalized Persons, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 
806 (2000). 
21. 485 U.S. 439, 441–42 (1988). 
22. See, e.g., EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 18, at 91–92, 242–44; 1 KENT
GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 192– 
200 (2006); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 115, 125–26 (1992).
23. 485 U.S. at 451 (quoting Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 
795 F.2d 688, 693 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
24. Id. at 450. 
 25. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 18, at 243–44 (noting that Congress promptly
defunded the road project). 
966
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In fact, as I have argued at greater length elsewhere, American law 
singles out religion by treating it as a good thing.26  The fact that conduct 
is religious counts as a reason to accommodate it, conscientious or not. 
Defer for now the question whether this treatment is defensible. It is 
in fact what American law does.27 
Leiter is not alone.  Many distinguished legal theorists and philosophers
have been drawn to the idea that it is conscience, rather than religion, 
that is entitled to special protection, and the Supreme Court has sometimes 
embraced the same position.28  Perhaps Leiter is simply following their
lead.  Their reasons for emphasizing conscience are not helpful to 
Leiter, however. 
Leiter’s own attraction to conscience is undertheorized.  Why might
conscience ever be entitled to any special consideration?  We would 
need to know that before we could decide whether religious conscience is 
26. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment 
Clause, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831 (2009) [hereinafter Koppelman, Corruption of 
Religion]; Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair To Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006
U. ILL. L. REV. 571 [hereinafter Koppelman, Is It Fair To Give Religion Special 
Treatment?]; Andrew Koppelman, No Expressly Religious Orthodoxy: A Response to
Steven D. Smith, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 729 (2003); Andrew Koppelman, Secular 
Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87 (2002) [hereinafter Koppelman, Secular Purpose]; Andrew
Koppelman, The Troublesome Religious Roots of Religious Neutrality, 84 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 865 (2009). 
27. For this reason, it is a fundamental mistake to describe this singling out as
“toleration,” in Leiter’s sense of believing a group’s practices to be wrong or
undesirable and yet putting up with them.  Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, supra note 1, at
2 (quoting Bernard Williams, Toleration: An Impossible Virtue?, in TOLERATION: AN 
ELUSIVE VIRTUE 18, 19 (David Heyd ed., 1996)).  American law does not treat 
religion, even minority religion, as wrong or undesirable.  Toleration in this sense is 
not the central idea of the contemporary American regime or even a component of it, 
but merely a historical precursor. 
28. See, e.g., KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY 98 (2005); 
WILLIAM A. GALSTON, THE PRACTICE OF LIBERAL PLURALISM 45–69 (2005); AMY 
GUTMANN, IDENTITY IN DEMOCRACY 151–91 (2003); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S 
DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 65–71 (1996); Ira C. 
Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 775 (1992); 
Rodney K. Smith, Conscience, Coercion and the Establishment of Religion: The
Beginning of an End to the Wanderings of a Wayward Judiciary?, 43 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 917, 926–29, 961 (1993); Rodney K. Smith, Converting the Religious Equality
Amendment into a Statute with a Little “Conscience,” 1996 BYU L. REV. 645, 663– 
66; Rogers M. Smith, “Equal” Treatment? A Liberal Separationist View, in  EQUAL
TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 179, 190–94 (Steven V. Monsma 
& J. Christopher Soper eds., 1998). 
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something special.29  Perhaps the will to be moral is valuable, and it
warrants some deference even if we think the agent mistaken about 
what morality requires.30  Perhaps people’s life-defining commitments—
moral or otherwise—should be accommodated when reasonably
possible.31  There are many other accounts of the appropriate role of
conscience in the law’s treatment of persons.32  Leiter never tells us
which of these is his.  He assumes that conscience is morally significant, 
but he never explains why.33 
Much of the attractiveness of conscience for contemporary theorists 
arises from its perceived capacity to resolve a tension between free 
exercise and establishment principles.  The Court has declared that 
“[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. 
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
29. Colonial and founding-era sources are completely unhelpful and potentially
misleading on this question because at that time conscience was taken to refer only to
religious matters, and the possibility of nonreligious conscience was not even considered.
See  WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
122–23 (1985); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of 
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1493–94 (1990).  Modern readers 
are often tempted to read these sources anachronistically.
30. See generally GUTMANN, supra note 28.
31. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND
MORALITY 280–81 (1979).  Leiter comes close to this view in one footnote, in which 
he concedes that many religious believers “in the industrialized nations” have beliefs
that are “rarely categorical in their commands.”  Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, supra 
note 1, at 24 n.58. Whatever reasons there are for tolerating these believers, they are 
unlikely to be “peculiar to this ‘softer’ form of religious belief and practice, which is
harder to distinguish from other exercises of conscience that figure in people’s lives.” Id.
Here conscience no longer refers to categorical commands; it seems to be broadened to
anything that someone might want to do. Some writers understand conscience this
broadly. See, e.g., DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 140–44 
(1986). However, there is no evidence outside Leiter’s footnote that this is his view.
32. For a survey, see Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and
Religious Exemptions, 15 LEGAL THEORY 215 (2009).  There are also multiple conceptions 
of conscience in moral reasoning.  See generally Thomas E. Hill Jr., Four Conceptions 
of Conscience, in 40 NOMOS: INTEGRITY AND CONSCIENCE 13 (Ian Shapiro & Robert 
Adams eds., 1998). 
33. He does quote the defense of “liberty of conscience” in JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 206–07 (1971), and notes that nothing in Rawls’s argument is 
specific to religion.  Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, supra note 1, at 6–7.  But Rawls 
does not define what he means by liberty of conscience, and what he does say is so 
vague that it might be limited to freedom from deliberate religious persecution.  His
later discussion of conscientious objection is confined to resistance to military conscription. 
See RAWLS, supra, at 377–82.  At no point does Rawls discuss conscience at the level 
of abstraction that Leiter has in mind. 
Leiter also considers a utilitarian argument, that “being able to choose what to 
believe and how to live” are elements of a good life.  Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, 
supra note 1, at 7 (emphasis omitted).  This, of course, is no basis for singling out 
conscience, either.
968
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one religion over another.”34  The Establishment Clause “mandates
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between
religion and nonreligion.”35  But the Court has also acknowledged that
“the Free Exercise Clause, . . . by its terms, gives special protection to 
the exercise of religion.”36 This generates a puzzle.  It is not logically
possible for the government both to be neutral between religion and 
nonreligion and to give religion special protection.  Some Justices and
many commentators have therefore regarded the First Amendment as
in tension with itself.37 
Conscience promises a way out of the dilemma by describing the 
basis of free exercise in a way that specifies only the internal psychology
of the person exempted, without endorsing any claims about religious
truth.  Thus it is possible to give religion special treatment without
favoring religion as such.  The attractiveness of this approach was
particularly salient in two draft exemption cases from the Vietnam 
War, United States v. Seeger38 and Welsh v. United States,39 in which 
the Supreme Court avoided constitutional difficulties by reading out of
the statute a provision that apparently confined the accommodation to 
claimants who believed in God.  Justice Harlan, casting the deciding vote 
in the last of these cases, thought that the law impermissibly discriminated
on the basis of religion—that it drew “a distinction between theistic 
and nontheistic religions.”40  If Congress was going to create exemptions, 
Justice Harlan thought, it was constitutionally required to show “equal
regard for men of nonreligious conscience.”41 
The question of religious accommodation unrelated to conscience of 
course did not arise in Seeger or Welsh, or in many of the other leading
religious accommodation cases.42  Many commentators treated these 
34. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). 
35. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). 
36. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981) (citing Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). 
37. “[T]he two Clauses [Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause] . . . often
exert conflicting pressures.”  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005). 
38. 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965). 
39. 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970).  Even in these cases, the Court’s view of religion
is not confined to conscience.  See infra note 90. 
40. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 348 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
41. Id. at 360 n.12. 
42. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963). 
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cases as more paradigmatic than they really were and concluded that
conscience, rather than religion, was as a general matter the object of 
religious accommodation—a bolder claim than Justice Harlan had 
made.
The Court, however, has never rejected the protection of religion as 
such and has rather declared that it is permissible for the legislature to 
single out religion for special treatment.43  So the focus on conscience 
is appropriate if Leiter is trying to criticize the commentators who have 
focused on it as a reason to protect religion, such as Michael Sandel44 
or Michael McConnell,45 but it is not appropriate if he is trying to 
criticize American law.  American law is not aiming, clumsily, to protect
conscience.  It is doing something else.
Once Leiter has assumed that only conscience is the object of 
religious accommodation, then the problem immediately arises why only 
religious exercises of conscience are singled out for special protection. 
Unsurprisingly, he concludes that there is no justification for special 
tolerance for religion thus understood: “Singling out religion for
toleration is tantamount to thinking we ought to encourage precisely this
conjunction of categorical fervor based on epistemic indifference.”46 
The conclusion is tautological because the initial decision to focus
on conscience takes its appeal precisely from the fact that it does not
single out religion.  In short, the whole argument of Why Tolerate
Religion? appears to be based on a mistake about its object. 
There is still an argument to be had about whether it is fair to single 
out religion for special treatment.  In that inquiry, conscience turns out
not to be an important category.47 
III. APPRAISAL RESPECT AND SEMANTIC MEANING
In his newer paper, Leiter takes up a different question: is a person’s 
religion an appropriate object of what Stephen Darwall calls “Appraisal
Respect,” which “consists in an attitude of positive appraisal,” such as 
43. “Religious accommodations . . . need not ‘come packaged with benefits to
secular entities.’”  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005) (quoting Corp. of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 
327, 338 (1987)). 
 44. SANDEL, supra note 28, at 65–71. 
45. Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1, 30 (2000). 
 46. Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, supra note 1, at 25–26. 
47. See generally Koppelman, Is It Fair To Give Religion Special Treatment?, 
supra note 26. 
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“esteem or a high regard for someone”?48  Leiter concludes that such 
respect is not warranted.
Leiter is writing, in part, in reaction to his University of Chicago 
colleague Martha Nussbaum’s claim that tolerance is “too grudging
and weak” an attitude toward religion, and we need “special respect for
the faculty in human beings in which they search for life’s ultimate
meaning.”49  This respect is related to the thought that “everyone has 
inside something infinitely precious, something that demands respect 
from us all, and something in regard to which we are all basically 
equal.”50  To this, Leiter responds that what Nussbaum has described is
not an appropriate object of respect: “[h]umans are roughly equal in
many faculties, but it seems odd to think that deficient exercises of those
faculties should elicit a moral attitude beyond that of tolerance.”51 
Leiter’s impatience is understandable.  Nussbaum’s exposition of
her position—which, I will argue here, is right—is summary and 
underdefended.  This may be intentional because she may fear that 
any deeper specification will lose part of her intended audience; she 
aims at an overlapping consensus, and the price of this is some
vagueness.52  She does not explain why respect for a faculty must mean 
respect for any particular way that the faculty is exercised.  Respect for 
religion depends on something more than respect for capabilities as 
such.  So Nussbaum ends up treating religion as something special, 
though that is not her official position.53  In that position, Nussbaum is
not really that far from Leiter because her claim is that the power to 
find meaning, not that of finding religious meaning, is what is entitled 
to respect. 
How do we know that religion is “deficient”?  The answer is tied to 
Leiter’s narrow definition of religious belief.  In the second paper, he 
 48. Leiter, Foundations, supra note 1, at 939 (quoting Stephen L. Darwall, Two
Kinds of Respect, 88 ETHICS 36, 38–39 (1977)). 
49. Id. at 943 (quoting NUSSBAUM, supra note 6, at 52).
 50. NUSSBAUM, supra note 6, at 52, quoted in Leiter, Foundations, supra note 
1, at 943. 
 51. Leiter, Foundations, supra note 1, at 943. 
52. On the peculiar kind of overlapping consensus that Nussbaum proposes—
very different from that envisioned by Rawls—see Andrew Koppelman, The Limits of 
Constructivism: Can Rawls Condemn Female Genital Mutilation?, 71 REV. POL. 459, 
480–81 (2009). 
53. See Koppelman, Is It Fair To Give Religion Special Treatment?, supra note 
26, at 597–601. 
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transplants the definition of religion nearly verbatim from the first.54 
Why?
When the issue was legal accommodation, our hypothesis, above, 
was that Leiter understandably followed the lead of some commentators
who thought that what was being accommodated was conscience.  In 
the context of determining Appraisal Respect, however, why does
conscience have any role at all in the argument? At this point, 
whatever reason there may have been for defining religion narrowly 
has disappeared.55  In particular, it is puzzling why religious practice is
left out of account, and the definition focuses only on belief—and not
all belief but only belief that lacks epistemic warrant and generates 
categorical commands. On the other hand, because belief’s lack of 
epistemic warrant is what most troubles Leiter, it is not clear why he 
persists in keeping categorical commands in his definition.  Would not
belief without epistemic warrant be culpable even if it issued in no 
commands at all?  Sometimes religion leads people to believe things
that are manifestly wacky56: the Creation Museum in Kentucky depicts
a triceratops with a saddle.57  It is pretty clear what Leiter thinks of
that, but it is not religion according to his definition. 
He explains that he treats beliefs as central because “it is hard to see
how mindless or habitual religious practices could claim whatever 
respect, affirmative or minimal, is due matters of conscience.”58  Once 
54. There are subtle changes.  He no longer states that he is describing “what 
distinguishes religious belief from other kinds of beliefs.”  Leiter, Why Tolerate 
Religion?, supra note 1, at 15.  Instead, he says that “for all religions, there are at least
some beliefs central to the religion that” have the characteristics he enumerates. 
Leiter, Foundations, supra note 1, at 944.  This opens the possibility that the state’s
reasons for singling out religion may not be the distinguishing characteristics on which
Leiter focuses because those characteristics are no longer alleged to be true of each 
and every religious belief.  Indeed, unless the state expressly incorporates Leiter’s 
definition, it is certain that it has something else in mind. 
55. Also, he sets the task of the paper as determining what moral attitude toward
religion “makes the most sense given what religion is.”  Leiter, Foundations, supra 
note 1, at 936.  This way of posing the problem makes no sense if he is referring to
anything other than the semantic meaning.
56. Actually, quite a lot of the time.  Only 39% of Americans believe in the 
theory of evolution, smaller than the roughly 44% who think that God created humans 
within the last 10,000 years.  This superstition divides on party lines, affecting 60% of
Republicans and 38% of Democrats. See Frank Newport, On Darwin’s Birthday, Only 
4 in 10 Believe in Evolution, GALLUP (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 
114544/darwin-birthday-believe-evolution.aspx; Frank Newport, Republicans, Democrats
Differ on Creationism, GALLUP (June 20, 2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/108226/ 
Republicans-Democrats-Differ-Creationism.aspx.
57. For a photograph, see Creation Museum, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Creation_Museum (last modified Sept. 26, 2010 at 10:03 AM). 
 58. Leiter, Foundations, supra note 1, at 945 n.38. 
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again, conscience is inseparable from his understanding of religion;
any religious practice that is not based on conscience is dismissed as
“mindless” or “habitual.”  Religious action can be divided without
remainder into the mandates of conscience and mindless habit.  This is 
a weird way to map human action.  When authors write silly creationist
tracts, they are probably not required to do so by conscience, but their 
activity is hardly mindless—they are vigorously using their minds, just 
not very well. Neither is a grieving mother’s decision to place a
religious marker on the grave of her child mindless.59 
Practices, religious and otherwise, are often fraught with significance
for the persons who perform them, even if the practices are not 
conscientiously compelled.  Core religious practices often have nothing to
do with conscience.  One illustrative bit of data: when a survey asked 
Catholics why they attended Mass, the largest group, 37 percent, pointed 
to “the feeling of meditating and communicating with God,” while 
only 20 percent referred to the “need to receive the Sacrament of Holy 
Communion,” and only 6 percent said “[t]he Church requires that I 
attend.”60  This experience-based religiosity is increasingly common in 
the United States across all religious denominations.61 
I have been beating up on Leiter’s definition of religion, but let us be 
fair: nobody’s definition works very well.62  Leiter denounces the
59. See WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
18 (2005). 
 60. JIM CASTELLI & JOSEPH GREMILLION, THE EMERGING PARISH: THE NOTRE
DAME STUDY OF CATHOLIC LIFE SINCE VATICAN II 132 tbl.11 (1987).  For an argument 
that this feeling of connection is central to modern American Catholic practice, see 
generally ANDREW GREELEY, THE CATHOLIC IMAGINATION (2000). 
61. See generally ALAN WOLFE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN RELIGION:
HOW WE ACTUALLY LIVE OUR FAITH (2003); ROBERT WUTHNOW, AMERICA AND THE 
CHALLENGES OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY (2005). 
62. Including mine.  Leiter observes that a formulation I once proposed, “all 
belief systems that make ultimate claims about the meaning of human existence,” is
obviously overinclusive. Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, supra note 1, at 13 n.30 (citing 
Koppelman, Secular Purpose, supra note 26, at 135).  His criticism is accurate.  My
article incoherently both endorses the “family resemblance” idea and attempts what 
looks like a definition, which, it should have been made clear, was really just a gesture 
in the direction of the family.  Koppelman, Secular Purpose, supra note 26, at 129, 
135 & n.156.  I had not yet fully absorbed the Wittgensteinian point that I make in the text
below.
Leiter makes a second criticism.  In Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, supra note 1, at 
13 n.30, he offers, as evidence that my understanding of religion is overbroad, the fact 
that I include as an example of a religious view Nietzsche’s claim that “[t]he total 
character of the world . . . is in all eternity chaos—in the sense not of a lack of
 973
























   
“Wittgensteinian habit” of some scholars of “not even attempting an 
analysis of religion on the grounds that it is a family resemblance 
concept.”63  In a footnote, he cites with approval Bernard Suits’s claim 
that even Wittgenstein’s classic example, the word game, actually is
susceptible of precise definition.  It is hard to tell what Leiter is trying 
to say here.  Even if it were conceded that Wittgenstein is wrong about
game, it would not follow that every word is susceptible of precise
definition and that there are no cluster concepts.  So the implication 
must be that, even if there were clusters, religion can be shown not to 
be one of them if we only think hard enough.  And Leiter cashes this 
out with his own definition. 
Whether any definition is satisfactory, as noted earlier, will depend 
on what it is used for.  If its aim is to capture a word’s normal semantic 
meaning, by displaying the necessary and sufficient conditions for its 
use, then Leiter’s definition is a failure, for the reasons already discussed.
If it is a term of art, then its specialized purpose needs to be made
clear.  In Why Tolerate Religion?, as we have seen, he does use it as a 
term of art, though his reasons for doing so evidently rest on a mistake
about the reasons for religious accommodation.  In Foundations, neither 
the semantic nor the specialized meaning suits his purpose.  He sticks 
to his definition, but the object of his negative evaluation can only be a 
subset—an arbitrarily drawn subset—of religious activity.
The Wittgensteinian idea that religion is a cluster concept is related 
to Wittgenstein’s idea that words are tools and that “the meaning of a 
word is its use in the language.”64  Because a word may be used for 
any of a wide variety of purposes, far beyond the purpose for which it 
was originally devised, there is no reason to presume that there must
be a neat and closed list of necessary and sufficient conditions for the
appropriate use of a word, any more than there is a neat and closed list 
necessity but of a lack of order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever
other names there are for our aesthetic anthropomorphisms.”  See FRIEDRICH 
NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 168 (Walter Kaufmann trans., Vintage Books 1974) 
(1887), quoted in Koppelman, Secular Purpose, supra note 26, at 131.  There is no 
doubt, however, that the teaching of Nietzsche’s view as correct, in the public schools, 
would violate the ban on establishment of religion.  Part of the reason is that there is
no basis for confidence that Nietzsche is right.  Another large part is that religion is 
regarded as a good thing that is likely to be damaged by deliberate government 
manipulation.  See Koppelman, Corruption of Religion, supra note 26, at 1834. 
 63. Leiter, Foundations, supra note 1, at 937.  I am among the targets here: I
have adopted and developed the family resemblance concept in a series of articles.
See, e.g., Koppelman, Corruption of Religion, supra note 26, at 1905–08. 
 64. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 18 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 3d ed. 2001) (1953). 
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of necessary and sufficient conditions for the appropriate use of a knife
or a rock. 
Religion is a peculiarly bad candidate for an essence.  As Jonathan
Z. Smith has observed, the term religion denotes an anthropological 
category, arising out of a particular Western practice of encountering
and accounting for foreign belief systems associated with geopolitical 
entities with which the West was forced to deal.65  Arising thus out of a
specific historical situation and evolving in unpredictable ways thereafter, 
religion would be surprising if it had any essential denotation.  And it 
covers such a huge range of human practices that it would be equally 
surprising if religion and religious belief were equivalents. 
The conflation of religion and belief is likewise an artifact of a
particular historical moment.  During the Reformation, an immediate
consequence of Luther’s objections to Church authority was a growing, 
and eventually obsessive, focus on doctrinal disputes. Elaborate
theological edifices such as Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion
and the pronouncements of the Council of Trent brought about an
understanding of religion that was based less on piety and ritual than 
on intellectual assent.66  Religious persecution during the Reformation 
was based centrally on the victims’ refusal to accept specified 
philosophical claims.  This conception of religion is shared by modern 
atheists, who understand religion to consist essentially of dubious factual 
claims.67  But however important propositions were to lived religious
experience during the age of religious wars, it is not, as we have seen, 
central to what religion means to Americans today.68  It is my impression 
rather that adherence to propositions is something of an embarrassment 
for many contemporary religious Americans, which they tolerate 
because of the benefits that religious practice provides. 
Leiter observes that the singling out of religion has been justified by 
some writers, myself included, because it is good for society, or the
believer, or both.  He dismisses this strategy because it “begs the 
65. See generally Jonathan Z. Smith, Religion, Religions, Religious, in CRITICAL 
TERMS FOR RELIGIOUS STUDIES 269 (Mark C. Taylor ed., 1998). 
 66. JAMES TURNER, WITHOUT GOD, WITHOUT CREED: THE ORIGINS OF UNBELIEF
IN AMERICA 23–25 (1985). 
67. Indeed, as Turner shows, modern atheism was made possible by this conception
of religion. See generally id. 
68. Or to most people on most of the planet during most of human history. See
generally WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION (1962). 
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question of what religion is, and the answers these writers offer turn 
out to be over- and under-inclusive in rather obvious ways.”69  The answer 
to this objection is the Wittgensteinian one: there is no definition.  We 
know it when we see it. 
How unsatisfactory is this answer?  It depends on how much doubt
there is about the term’s application.  Leiter works hard to show that
his definition does not include Marxism or morality more generally, 
but this is a worry only because the semantic meaning is not doubtful; 
everyone already knows that these are not religions.  Foreign courts
have done no better than American courts at devising a definition.70 
Even the Internal Revenue Service uses an analogical criterion.71  Yet
the consequence is not ambiguity or confusion about what the law is 
singling out for special treatment.  The list of reported cases that have
had to determine a definition of religion is a remarkably short one.72 
Leiter’s Procrustean strategy may still be useful as a way of isolating 
a specific problem, which is how to assess that precise subset of religious
ideas that do fit within his definition.  So let us stick to that.  Leiter thinks
“religious belief is a culpable form of unwarranted belief” in light of
the “ordinary epistemic standards” that are followed “in common sense
and the sciences.”73  Those standards—“the standards of evidence . . . that
have been vindicated a posteriori since the scientific revolution”74—are
standards that any belief must now live up to.  Basing one’s behavior 
on anything else is culpable. 
 69. Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, supra note 1, at 13 n.30. 
 70. REX AHDAR & IAN LEIGH, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE LIBERAL STATE 110– 
26 (2005); T. Jeremy Gunn, The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of “Religion” in
International Law, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 189, 189–200 (2003).  Leiter writes, against 
a Wittgensteinian answer, that “we are not entitled to conclude that there is no analysis 
available until we try to produce one” and “we should at least first try to do better 
before giving up.”  Leiter, Foundations, supra note 1, at 937 & n.5.  After worldwide 
efforts spanning decades have failed, how long are we obligated to keep trying? 
71. See Definitions of Religious Organization and Church, Tax Mgm’t (BNA)
No. 869-1st (2007), available at http://www.bna.com.
72. See Religion, 36C WORDS AND PHRASES (2002 & Supp. 2009).  The reference I
rely on here, Words and Phrases, is a 132-volume set collecting brief annotations of
cases from 1658 to present.  Each case discusses the contested definition of a word whose
meaning determines rights, duties, obligations, and liabilities of the parties. See 10 
WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 416 (2d ed. 2005).  Some words have 
received an enormous amount of attention from the courts.  Two examples, drawn at
random from the first volume of this immense compilation, each exceed 100 pages: 
“abandonment,” 1 WORDS AND PHRASES (2007), and “abuse of discretion,” 1 WORDS 
AND PHRASES (2007 & Supp. 2009). 
 73. Leiter, Foundations, supra note 1, at 955. 
 74. Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, supra note 1, at 23.
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This condemnation does not just extend to religious beliefs.  It
obviously would extend to nonreligious beliefs that are based on a 
failure to adhere to the same epistemic standards.  Just how far does it 
extend? 
Pretty far.  Far enough, in fact, that it is not clear that a decision that 
one has an obligation to act morally is not culpable in just the same 
way.  It is far from clear that the existence of any particular moral
obligation can be demonstrated using the ordinary epistemic standards 
that are followed in common sense and the sciences.  Leiter recognizes 
this problem when he defends his definition: “For is not morality
characterized both by categoricity of its commands and its insulation 
from reasons and evidence (as reasons and evidence are understood,
e.g., in the sciences)?”75  He does not want to drift too far away from
the ordinary semantic meaning of religion, so he must show that his 
definition does not encompass all of morality. 
He responds that the two leading philosophical schools of thought
about the nature of morality agree that morality is not insulated from 
evidence in the way that religion is.  Cognitivist realists think that moral 
judgments can be justified in the same way as any other judgments. 
For noncognitivist antirealists, the mental states expressed by moral 
judgments are “not truth-apt, that is, are by their nature insulated from
reasons and evidence,” and this distinguishes them from religious
judgments, which “do express beliefs and so, in principle, could be
answerable to reasons and evidence, but are held to be insulated from 
them.”76 
But this does not epistemically exculpate the moral behavior of most 
people, who are unfamiliar with this philosophical literature.  They are 
not relying on the fact, if it is a fact, that the philosophers have
established that moral judgments are ontologically and epistemologically
distinguishable from religious judgments. The conclusions of
contemporary philosophy are far more esoteric than those of
contemporary science.  If one is culpable for not being familiar with 
the former, then most of humanity is invincibly culpable, if that label
is even coherent.77  On a practical and phenomenological level, the
75. Id. at 20. 
76. Id. at 21; Leiter, Foundations, supra note 1, at 950–51. 
77. I think it is not.  The old theological idea of invincible ignorance referred to
the problem of persons, such as pagans and infants, who are ignorant of the Christian
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basis for moral judgments is often hard to distinguish from the basis 
for religious judgments.  In each case, people rely on some combination 
of testimony and intuition,78 and even moral heroes may be deeply
inarticulate about the basis of their intuitions.79 
But here we are once again speaking of conscience, and as noted
earlier, religious people—and most nonreligious people as well—think
that they live in a world that has moral significance that reaches far 
beyond the very limited field of categorical commands. 
IV. WHAT GOOD IS RELIGION? 
The relevant category is not categorical command but what Charles 
Taylor calls “strong evaluation,” a set of assessments that involve
“discriminations of right or wrong, better or worse, higher or lower, 
which are not rendered valid by our own desires, inclinations, or
choices, but rather stand independent of these and offer standards by
which they can be judged.”80  A person who did not make any such
discriminations, a “simple weigher of alternatives,” would be a very
strange sort of person;81 it is not clear whether there could be a person
so lacking in depth.82 
For many, Taylor observes, strong evaluation is inseparable from 
religion: “their highest sense of the good has been developed in a 
message because they have never had any opportunity to hear it.  Such people were not 
thereby made culpable for the same reason that “invincible culpability” makes no sense:
ought implies can.  People today vary enormously in their exposure to the information that 
Leiter thinks makes religion epistemically indefensible.  They also vary in the degree
to which their religious beliefs compete with scientific propositions.  Many theists are 
entirely untroubled by Darwin, for example. 
78. See Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 
30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 763, 775 (1993). 
79. J. David Velleman observes that people who took terrifying risks in order to
save Jews from the Holocaust “often disappointed postwar interviewers who asked
about their reasoning and motives,” because they often failed to invoke any moral 
concepts such as obligation or virtue.  J. DAVID VELLEMAN, HOW WE GET ALONG 155– 
56 (2009).  Instead, they offered such unsatisfactory answers as, “I cannot give you
any reasons.  It was not a question of reasoning.  Let’s put it this way.  There were
people in need and we helped them.” Id. at 156 n.40 (quoting SAMUEL P. OLINER &
PEARL M. OLINER, THE ALTRUISTIC PERSONALITY: RESCUERS OF JEWS IN NAZI EUROPE
216 (1988)). 
 80. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
IDENTITY 4 (1989). 
 81. 1 CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE
23 (1985). 
82. Id. at 28; TAYLOR, supra note 80, at 27.  Even utilitarians who are officially
committed to such simple weighing tend to be animated by motives of a loftier sort; 
they cannot account for their own existence. See id. at 76–86, 322–45. 
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profoundly religious context” and “is inconceivable without God.”83 
Their understanding that the world makes sense, that they live significant,
morally intelligible lives in a significant, morally intelligible world, is
closely tied to their religious beliefs and practices.84  Of course, strong 
evaluation is not a workable legal standard, so we must rely on proxies.
Religion is a pretty good proxy.  It does not exhaust the objects of 
strong evaluation or Appraisal Respect, but no single standard can do
that.  All the law can do is enumerate such objects one at a time.  That 
is what it is doing when it singles out religion for special treatment.85 
The basic social function of religion, Peter Berger observed long 
ago, is one of a distinctive kind of legitimation: “[r]eligion legitimates 
social institutions by bestowing upon them an ultimately valid
ontological status, that is, by locating them within a sacred and cosmic
frame of reference.”86  This entails a personal function for individuals 
as well: “the cosmization of the institutions permits the individual to 
have an ultimate sense of rightness, both cognitively and normatively, 
in the roles he is expected to play in society.”87  This way of putting 
matters sounds conservative, but the point applies equally to the roles 
of social critic, reformer, and revolutionary. 
One may object that this is epistemically culpable: there is no basis 
for any confidence that anything in the world ultimately is validated by 
a transcendent frame of reference.  We just have to learn to live without
any ultimate sense of rightness.  But this is also a kind of faith: there is
no basis for confidence in the rejection of a transcendent frame of
reference, either.  The old agnostic point, that a finite being cannot know
an infinite one, cuts both ways.  How can you know that there is no
transcendent frame?88  What epistemic warrant is there for that bold 
 83. CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 544 (2007). 
84. Of course, many religions teach that some pressing moral questions are 
mysteries, unintelligible to mortals.  But they situate these mysteries in a narrative in which 
they are not dangerous to the overall intelligibility of the world but rather contribute to
that intelligibility.  Thanks to Joseph Raz for demanding clarification on this point. 
85. See Koppelman, Is It Fair To Give Religion Special Treatment?, supra note 
26, at 574. 
 86. PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY OF RELIGION 33 (Anchor Books 1969) (1967). 
87. Id. at 37. 
88. I have always been fond of the following two-line joke: 
Q. Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so 
help you God?
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claim?  It is possible to be a strong religious adherent while fully 
acknowledging one’s lack of epistemic certainty.89 
What is really indispensable is hope.90  There is no epistemic warrant to
assert with confidence that the religious person’s hope is groundless.
If this is true—and the arguments for agnosticism are familiar—then 
the insistence upon the contrary is itself a culpably false belief.  Hope, 
by definition, involves an absence of sufficient evidence. 
We know that religion is not indispensable to intelligibility: many 
individuals, and even a few national cultures, function perfectly well 
without it.91  But the ability to do without religion is a late and peculiar
historical formation.  Modern humanism is itself shot through with
quasi-religious longings and even rituals.92  For most people, liberation 
from religious belief would produce only anomie and despair.  The 
A. If I knew the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, I would be
God. 
89. Many illustrations are available.  One is the present Pope, Benedict XVI:
[B]oth the believer and the unbeliever share, each in his own way, doubt and
belief, if they do not hide from themselves and from the truth of their being.
Neither can quite escape either doubt or belief; for the one, faith is present 
against doubt; for the other, through doubt and in the form of doubt.  It is the 
basic pattern of man’s destiny only to be allowed to find the finality of his
existence in this unceasing rivalry between doubt and belief, temptation and
certainty.  Perhaps in precisely this way doubt, which saves both sides from 
being shut up in their own worlds, could become an avenue of communication. 
It prevents both from enjoying complete self-satisfaction; it opens up the 
believer to the doubter and the doubter to the believer; for one, it is his share
in the fate of the unbeliever; for the other, the form in which belief remains
nevertheless a challenge to him. 
JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER, INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIANITY 46–47 (J.R. Foster
trans., Ignatius Press rev. ed. 2004) (1968). 
90. The Supreme Court has quoted with approval Paul Tillich’s description of
God as “the depths of your life, of the source of your being, of your ultimate concern, 
of what you take seriously without any reservation.”  United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 
163, 187 (1965) (quoting PAUL TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 57
(1948)).  That is already a more capacious idea than conscience, even though Seeger is 
often cited for the proposition—supported by other passages in the opinion—that
conscience is what the Court is protecting.  A few pages later in the same essay, Tillich
writes:
Perhaps you should call this depth hope, simply hope.  For if you find hope 
in the ground of history, you are united with the great prophets who were
able to look into the depth of their times, who tried to escape it, because they
could not stand the horror of their visions, and who yet had the strength to
look to an even deeper level and there to discover hope. 
TILLICH, supra, at 59.
91. See generally PHIL ZUCKERMAN, SOCIETY WITHOUT GOD: WHAT THE LEAST
RELIGIOUS NATIONS CAN TELL US ABOUT CONTENTMENT (2008). 
 92. TAYLOR, supra note 83, at 514–35; see generally REGINA MARA SCHWARTZ,
SACRAMENTAL POETICS AT THE DAWN OF SECULARISM: WHEN GOD LEFT THE WORLD
(2008). 
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avoidance of such states is an appropriate object of Appraisal Respect. 
So is the capacity to articulate at least some of the enormous range of 
élans and hopes that resist expression in secular discourse.93 
Leiter shares, and seeks to clarify, Simon Blackburn’s concern about
“respect creep,” an unfortunate cultural pathology in which the reasonable 
demand for minimal toleration gets transmuted into an unreasonable 
demand for deference and reverence.94  But Blackburn’s discussion
leaves open the question when reverence is appropriate.  Blackburn 
himself positively admires religious artists such as Donne, Milton, and 
Bach, who “try to give voice to the great events and emotions of human
life” in religious terms.95  His essay is fascinating because it begins
with a stance of suspicious hostility toward religion and slowly works 
its way toward a complex ambivalence, in which religion perhaps 
simply stands for “remembrances and pieties that it is human to have 
and that desperately need protection against the encroaching world of 
cost-benefit analysis and the surrendering of unbridled power to economic
interest.”96  Leiter agrees with Blackburn that religion can produce good 
outcomes, but Leiter is more transparently instrumentalist: religion is 
valuable only insofar as some religious people are led by their faith to 
do good things.  The “remembrances and pieties” do not seem to have
any intrinsic value for him. 
It is not possible to offer a unitary account of what religion is good
for.  Like a knife or a rock, it is something that people find already 
existing in the world, which they then put to a huge variety of uses.
Religion denotes a cluster of goods, including salvation, if you think
you need to be saved; harmony with the transcendent origin of universal
93. See STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE 211– 
25 (2010). 
 94. Simon Blackburn, Religion and Respect, in  PHILOSOPHERS WITHOUT GODS:
MEDITATIONS ON ATHEISM AND THE SECULAR LIFE 179, 180 (Louise M. Antony ed., 
2007). 
95. Id. at 186. 
96. Id. at 193.  Like Leiter, Blackburn deplores the tendency of the religious to 
believe dubious propositions of fact.  Many modern theologians, he observes, try to
rescue their position by rejecting such propositional claims as “onto-religion” and
instead adopting an “expressive interpretation” in which religion merely expresses an
emotional stance toward the world.  Id. at 183–84.  In order for this expressive stance 
to be psychologically sustainable, Blackburn objects, the ontological bit has to persist; 
without it the emotional part would lose its force.  Id. at 185.  He is probably right 
about this, but why presume that the amplification comes from certainty about the
ontological part?  Once more, hope may be enough to do the job.
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order, if it exists;97 responding to the fundamentally imperfect character 
of human life, if it is imperfect;98 courage in the face of the heartbreaking 
aspects of human existence, if that kind of encouragement helps;99 a 
transcendent underpinning for the resolution to act morally, if that kind
of underpinning helps;100 contact with the awesome and indescribable, 
if awe is something you feel;101 and many others.102  No general 
description of the good that religion seeks to promote can be satisfactory, 
politically or intellectually.103 
The value of religion will sometimes be a fit occasion for ambivalence,
in the same way that one is reasonably ambivalent about any human 
good that is sometimes abused by its possessor.  It is good for people 
to be clever and resourceful, but it would have been better if Hitler had 
been less clever and resourceful than he was.  Similarly, as Leiter 
observes, the devoutly religious include, on the one hand, those who 
opposed Nazism in Germany and apartheid in South Africa and the 
United States, but on the other, those who bomb abortion clinics and 
fly airplanes into buildings.104  It would be better if the latter’s ultimate
sense of rightness were replaced by vertiginous disorientation.  But
 97. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 89–90 (1980). 
 98. KEITH E. YANDELL, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 17, 21–34 (1999). 
99. See generally PAUL TILLICH, THE COURAGE TO BE (1952). 
 100. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 107–09 (Mary Gregor ed. 
& trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1788); IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN 
THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE 142–43 (Theodore M. Greene & Hoyt H. Hudson trans., 
Harper & Bros. 1960) (1793). 
 101. RUDOLF OTTO, THE IDEA OF THE HOLY 12–13 (John W. Harvey trans., 2d ed. 
1950) (1923). 
102. Here I am in agreement with McConnell, who argues that “[r]eligion is a 
special phenomenon, in part, because it plays such a wide variety of roles in human life,”
and elaborates the point with a large collection of heterogeneous illustrations.  McConnell,
supra note 45, at 42.  “[T]here is no other human phenomenon that combines all [the 
aspects of religion]; if there were such a concept, it would probably be viewed as a 
religion.” Id.
103. Charles Taylor has stated the difficulties for any general theory of religion, 
which incidentally has shown the difficulty with Nussbaum’s reduction of it to the
search for meaning: 
I doubt very much whether any such general theory can even be established. 
I mean a theory which can gather all the powerful élans and aspirations
which humans have manifested in the spiritual realm, and relate them to 
some single set of underlying needs or aims or tendencies (whether it be the 
desire for meaning or something else).  The phenomena are much too varied
and baffling for that; and even if they were more tractable, we would have to
stand at the end of history to be able to draw such conclusions. 
TAYLOR, supra note 83, at 679. 
 104. Leiter, Foundations, supra note 1, at 946; Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, 
supra note 1, at 16. 
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that does not mean that the sense of rightness is not a human good, a
good for the person who possesses it.
Leiter relies in part on the work of Macklem, but he does not address 
Macklem’s argument that sometimes a complete set of reasons for 
action is unavailable, but action would nonetheless facilitate our well-
being.105 In such a situation, when commitment is rationally
underdetermined, Macklem argues that “faith is valuable where the
inability to make the commitments that faith makes possible would 
have a negative impact on well-being, both because the commitments
in question are potentially valuable and because failure to make them
would be harmful.”106  Macklem is right about this.
Macklem nonetheless worries: “The difficulty with faith, secular or 
religious, is that it often serves as a substitute for knowledge and 
reason in settings where these are not only available but constitute a 
sounder basis for action and belief.”107  He is right about this, too, as
we saw in our earlier review of creationist piffle.  Reading Leiter, 
however, one gets the impression that this is the only aspect of religion 
that he notices. 
Macklem is correct that what interests us is not religion’s semantic
meaning but its moral significance.  Is there any reason to assign moral 
significance to the contents of the loose baggy sack of heterogeneous 
phenomena that fit within the semantic meaning of religion?108  Is  
105. Here he is some distance from Leiter.  For Macklem, faith is believing
something when reasons are unavailable.  The idea that reasons might just be unavailable is
never even considered by Leiter: faith is “believing something notwithstanding the 
evidence and reasons that fail to support it or even contradict it.”  Leiter, Foundations, 
supra note 1, at 947. 
 106. MACKLEM, supra note 11, at 140.  Macklem’s view of religion is nonetheless 
condescending: he writes that “for some people the nature of life and the content of
morality are unknowable on the basis of reason alone,” id. at 139–40, implying that he
is one of the smart ones who has the nature of life all figured out.  Lucky him. 
107. Id. at 140. 
108. Cf. SHEL SILVERSTEIN, What’s In the Sack?, in WHERE THE SIDEWALK ENDS
111, 111 (1974): 
What’s in the sack?  What’s in the sack? 
Is it some mushrooms or is it the moon?
Is it love letters or downy goosefeathers? 
Or maybe the world’s most enormous balloon? 
What’s in the sack?  That’s all they ask me.
Could it be popcorn or marbles or books? 
Is it two years’ worth of your dirty laundry,
Or the biggest ol’ meatball that’s ever been cooked?
 983


















there any reason to treat the stuff in the sack as good?  Macklem
doubts it.  The Wittgensteinian mess means that religion as such cannot 
have moral significance.  He proposes that courts undertake “a frank 
examination of the contribution that any doctrine held on the basis of 
faith, be it traditional or non-traditional, is capable of making to well-
being.”109 
There are two decisive objections to Macklem’s proposal, one 
political and one moral.  The political objection is that, in a pluralistic
society, there are obvious dangers in giving judges the power to assign 
legal consequences to different religious beliefs based on the judges’
own conceptions of well-being.  Macklem’s own confident withholding
of protection from “cults” is not reassuring.110  The moral objection is
that it is arrogant to assess the entirety of another’s life-world and 
confidently conclude that, taken as a whole, it is so silly that the person 
would be better off with a radical conversion.  Perhaps we are entitled 
to do this with respect to people whose lives are manifestly wretched, 
such as homeless drug addicts, but we do not know most of our fellow 
citizens well enough to make such judgments with any degree of 
confidence.111 There are enough good things in the sack that there are
sufficient reasons to pronounce the sack as such a container of good
things and to respect the other fellow’s sack despite—or, perhaps, 
because—we are not sure just what is in it.112  So the decision to define
 109. MACKLEM, supra note 11, at 142. 
110. Id.
111. Doubts on this score are reinforced by Joseph Raz’s observation that modern
life tends to generate what he calls “competitive pluralism”: a liberal society tends to 
generate “virtues which tend, given human nature, to encourage intolerance of other virtues,” 
and the virtue of toleration is therefore necessary.  Joseph Raz, Autonomy, Toleration, 
and the Harm Principle, in  JUSTIFYING TOLERATION: CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 155, 164 (Susan Mendus ed., 1988).  If this is correct and if state actors 
are likely to be inappropriately intolerant in just this way, then there is reason to constrain 
those actors by rules that require them to be neutral with respect to some matters about 
which they are convinced that they have sound views.  Religion can reasonably be 
thought to be one of those matters. 
 112. Macklem writes: 
If a body of people claims that Jesus lives and that they depend upon faith in 
that fact for their sense of purpose in life, it is possible for us to recognize 
and respect that claim without either endorsing it or seeing any reason to 
endorse it, for faith in the Resurrection and its implications is one way of 
coming to terms with death, an issue that we can all recognize to be in some 
sense genuinely mysterious.  But if a body of people claims that Elvis lives 
and that they depend upon faith in that fact in order to carry on in life we 
would be forced to conclude that they needed professional help, for belief 
that Elvis is still alive and eating cheeseburgers is not a way of coming to 
terms with death or any other mystery in life but is simply an unfortunate 
and damaging consequence of the cult of celebrity. 
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religion vaguely, relying on the fuzzy semantic meaning, itself rests on 
moral grounds.113 
Beliefs serve two functions, which we may call epistemic and
existential.  They can provide accurate maps of the world; they can 
also help to cope with life’s mysteries.  These functions sometimes
come into tension with one another.  It is nice to be able to do both, but
evidently that is not so easy for everyone.  The creationists’ epistemic 
folly is contemptible, but it is not pointless, and its effectiveness at 
performing the existential function may be an appropriate object of 
Appraisal Respect, in the same way I can admire someone’s skill at
opening a can with a screwdriver. 
So there is warrant for deeming the contents of the sack, the whole 
set of beliefs and practices that constitute religion, to be worthy of 
Appraisal Respect.  This, then, can justify the special treatment of religion 
by the law.  As Leiter observes, although Appraisal Respect demands 
only esteem, not any particular action, it “can also result in moral
MACKLEM, supra note 11, at 145 (footnote omitted).  I agree that the claim about Elvis
is as factually stupid as the triceratops with the saddle, but how can Macklem know 
that this is not a way of coming to terms with life’s mysteries?  I would need to know a 
lot more about the role of Elvis in these people’s lives before I could confidently
conclude that nothing about their strange beliefs is worthy of respect.  From the 
standpoint of science, the belief in the resurrection of Jesus is equally indefensible. 
113. Here it is not clear to me just how far I am from Nussbaum.  She proposes a 
complex position, in which the reasons for accommodation are modified by
institutional constraints, so that religion receives special treatment only because a 
broader accommodation for “the faculty in human beings with which they search for 
life’s ultimate meaning” would not be administrable.  NUSSBAUM, supra note 6, at 19. 
Conscience should be protected because it is valuable and vulnerable; it “needs a
protected space around it within which people can pursue their search for life’s 
meaning (or not pursue it, if they choose).”  Id.; see also id. at 37.  This does not single 
out religion.  On the other hand, “fair or unfair,” id. at 102, the text of the Free
Exercise Clause does single out religion.  The best reason for this singling out is that 
nonreligious reasons for seeking accommodation “are more likely to be personal and
individualistic, thus far more difficult to assess for sincerity and significance.” Id. at
165.  In short, things in the sack are more likely to be humanly important than things 
outside it.  Nussbaum approves of the Court’s extension, in Seeger and Welsh, of the 
definition of religion to include “forms of committed searching for meaning that had
no group affiliation,” id. at 171, but she acknowledges that this stretch perpetuates a 
different kind of unfairness because it will “reward articulate people and penalize
those, equally sincere, who cannot give a good account of themselves.”  Id. at 172. 
This unfairness is at least somewhat ameliorated by the singling out of religion
because the protection of religion as such is likely to protect some confused and 
inarticulate, but sincere, people.  See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981). 
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demands on action, when the highly appraised features are ones with
moral value or that one has a moral obligation to support or protect.”114 
If the contents of the sack deserve Appraisal Respect, then the government 
should support or protect them, too.
Life is in many ways perplexing and hard.  Finding a language to
describe our deepest commitments and hopes is especially hard. 
Philosophy may possibly have the resources to fill this need for a few 
people, but it is a specialized taste.115  Some people find a full and
satisfying meaning of life in the goods of the immanent world, but that 
is a specialized taste too.116 
So even when I find that religious people believe things that seem to
me incredible, I remind myself that they are simply doing the best they
can with the limited information that is available to all of us and that I 
am not myself doing much better than they.117  Intelligibility, and the
courage we need to act well, is indeed a precious thing, and the fact 
that it exists at all is far more important than the strange variety of forms 
that it takes.  So I have no trouble at all mustering Appraisal Respect
for other people’s religious beliefs.
In order for religion to be an object of Appraisal Respect, you need 
to see the problem for which religion is a solution.  Leiter simply does 
not see the predicament that most people are up against.  If there 
happen to be any holes in the philosophical apparatus in which he 
finds such comfort, then he is up against it himself, though he does not 
know it.  His position is blind to reality.  It is hard to have much respect
for that. 
 114. Leiter, Foundations, supra note 1, at 939–40. 
115. Even many philosophers who look down on religion are humbler than this. 
G.W.F. Hegel, for instance, no model of humility, thought that religion, despite its 
manifest imperfections, was the best way to make what is knowable via philosophy
intelligible to ordinary people.  He understood (with regret!) that not everyone can be a 
philosopher.  For a clear exposition, see MARK LILLA, THE STILLBORN GOD: RELIGION,
POLITICS, AND THE MODERN WEST 171–213 (2007). 
116. See, e.g., Blackburn, supra note 94, at 190–92. 
117. On the comparative weaknesses of theism and humanism, see Andrew
Koppelman, Naked Strong Evaluation, DISSENT, Winter 2009, at 105, 105–09 (reviewing
TAYLOR, supra note 83). 
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